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UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE: THE
VALIDITY OF MEDICAL PAYMENT SETOFF
PROVISIONS
Insurance was originally regarded as a mutual aid, an agreement
whereby individuals would share excessive losses that could not be
borne by a single member of the group without financial ruin.' This
risk-sharing concept of insurance soon lost support as the insurance
industry expanded to encompass automobile accident coverage, and
the application of negligence rules to related torts motivated the public
to think in strict terms of self-protection. 2 This self-interest which now
pervades the insurance industry is nowhere more evident than in the
area of uninsured motorist coverage. The relatively recent develop-
ment of statutorily required uninsured motorist coverage 3 has pitted
the insured party against his own carrier, each attempting to shift the
economic loss to the other.4
The battle between insurer and insured is being viciously fought,
each party refusing to yield to the demands of the other. The insured
attempts to maximize his recovery through "stacking," a process by
which the insured aggregates various uninsured motorist coverages to
increase his claim.' The insurer attempts to combat the insured claim-
1. P. PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS § 1 (1972); see S. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUB-
LIC POLICY 4 (1960). See generally C. BRAINARD, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ch. 16 (1961).
2. P. PRETZEL, supra note 1, at 3. The majority of motorists shift (rather than share) the
economic risk of injury or damage through the acquisition of automobile liability insurance. See
A. WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE § 1.1 (1969). Seealso C. SUNDERLIN,
SUNDERLIN ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE § 6 (1929).
3. On July 1, 1975, Maryland became the fiftieth state to statutorily require insurance com-
panies to offer uninsured motorist coverage in all automobile insurance policies. See MD. INS.
CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 541(c) (1975).
4. See P. PRETZEL, supra note I, at 9. The insured seeking recovery from his own insurer
must prove those same elements he would be expected to prove if the uninsured motorist were
insured. "Since fault is relevant, the carrier will benefit if it can show that its own insured was
negligent, the antithesis of its burden under the ordinary public liability portion of the policy."
Id. at 16.
5. Attempts by an insured to "stack" or "pyramid" various types of automobile insurance
coverages can be classified as either inter-policy stacking or intra-policy stacking.
"Intra-policy stacking [of uninsured motorist coverages] involves a single policy .... and al-
lows insurance coverage to be aggregated or 'stacked' to fully compensate the insured for damages
sustained." Comment, Intra-Policy Stacking of Uninsured Motorist and Medical Payments Cover-
ages To Be or Not To Be, 22 S.D.L. REV. 349, 350 (1977) (emphasis in original).
For example, a family may own four automobiles, all of which are covered under a single
family automobile liability policy with each automobile carrying uninsured motorist coverage of
1
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ant's use of stacking through an "other insurance" clause, a clause in
the insurance policy which expressly bars the insured from using sepa-
rate insurance coverages to supplement a claim.6 The insurer also tries
to limit his liability by inserting a "setoff" provision in the insurance
policy. A "setoff" provision deducts from the insured's uninsured mo-
torist recovery any amount paid or payable under the insured's medical
payment coverage.7
The validity of medical payment setoffs has not yet been chal-
lenged in Oklahoma courts. This comment will examine the current
legal status of these provisions in other jurisdictions and will predict
the fate of setoff clauses in Oklahoma. In order to determine how
Oklahoma will resolve the setoff issue, it is helpful to refer to two types
of persuasive authorities. Judicial decisions from other states directly
addressing the setoff question, as well as Oklahoma's treatment of
analogous issues, will serve as tools in ultimately predicting the future
judicial treatment of setoff provisions in Oklahoma.
$10,000 per person and $30,000 per accident. If a member of that family were injured in an
accident with a negligent uninsured motorist, intra-policy stacking would allow a maximum re-
covery of $40,000 (coverage of $10,000 per person multiplied by the four units on the policy). Id.
at 350.
Inter-policy stacking, on the other hand, involves more than one policy and allows insurance
coverage from each policy to be stacked to maximize the insured's recovery. Such stacking, for
purposes of the above example, would allow the same recovery as intra-policy stacking; it differs
only in that it involves several policies rather than four units of a single policy. Id.
See generally P. PRETZEL, supra note 1, § 25.5B. For current information on stacking, see A.
Winiss, supra note 2, § 2.60 (Supp. 1981).
6. An example of a typical "other insurance" clause reads:
[I]f the insured has other similar insurance available to him, and applicable to the
accident, the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits
of liability of this insurance and such other insurance, and the company shall not be
liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which this Uninsured Motorist Coverage
applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable limits of
liability of this insurance and such other insurance.
Subject to the foregoing. . . ,if the insured has other similar insurance available to
him against a loss caused by the Uninsured Motorist Coverage of this policy, the com-
pany shall not be liable under this policyfor a greater proportion of such loss than the
applicable limit of liability herein bears to the total applicable limits of liability of all
valid and collectible insurance against such loss.
Bose v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 186 Neb. 209, -, 181 N.W.2d 839, 840 (1970) (emphasis
added); see P. PRETZEL, supra note 1, § 25.5, at 81. ("other insurance" clause). See generally A.
WIDISS, supra note 2, §§ 2.60-.61.
7. An example of a typical "setoff" provision reads: "The company shall not be obligated to
pay under this coverage that part of the damages which the insured may be entitled to recover
from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile which represents expenses for medical
services paid or payable under Part II [Medical Payment Coverage]." Connelley v. Southern
Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 219 So. 2d 206, 208 (La. Ct. App. 1969).
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I. SETOFFS: A MATTER OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Before examining the validity of medical payment setoff provi-
sions, the consequences of a typical setoff provision can be illustrated
through the following hypothetical. Al purchased automobile insur-
ance from Faith Insurers. Under Coverage A in his policy, Al held
liability insurance. Coverage B provided Al with medical payment in-
surance and Coverage C gave Al protection against uninsured motor-
ists. One afternoon, Al was injured in an automobile accident with
Ed-an uninsured motorist. Ed was completely at fault. Al examined
Coverages B and C of his policy and found that he was covered up to
$2,000 in medical payment coverage and up to $10,000 in uninsured
motorist coverage. As Al's injuries from the accident were in excess of
$12,000, he filed a claim with Faith Insurers for the full amount. Faith
pointed out Clause D in Al's policy which provided: "any amounts
payable or paid under Coverage B will be deducted from payments
under Coverage C of this policy." In other words, Al's receipt of $2,000
in medical payments limited his uninsured motorist recovery to
$8,000.8
Although Al's reduced recovery is typical of the plight of insured
claimants nationwide, litigation involving setoff provisions has been
minimal.9 The primary reason for this scarcity of litigation is a matter
of dollars and cents: the amount of financial remuneration involved
(usually $3,000 or below), often does not warrant a long and expensive
appellate attack against the insurer's use of a setoff provision.' 0
In those jurisdictions, however, which have determined the valid-
ity of setoff provisions, the central consideration has been the interpre-
tation of the applicable uninsured motorist statute." Oklahoma's
uninsured motorist statute' 2 is typical of those in other states.' 3 It pro-
8. See Robey v. Northwestern Sec. Ins. Co., 270 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Ark. 1967) (source of
facts in hypothetical).
9. P. PRETZEL, supra note 1, at 51.
10. See I U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 101
(1970) states: "About one-third of the motor vehicles did not provide for medical payment bene-
fits. Most of the others had coverage limits ranging between $500 and $2000. About one out of
ten had limits above $2000."
11. See, e.g., Boehler v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 290 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Ark. 1968); Robey
v. Northwestern Sec. Ins. Co., 270 F. Supp. 466, 471 (W.D. Ark. 1967); Simpson v. Farmers Ins.
Co., 225 Kan. 508, -, 592 P.2d 445, 447 (1979); Protective Fire & Cas. Co. v. Woten, 186 Neb.
212,-, 181 N.W.2d 835, 838 (1970); Fernandez v. Selected Risks Ins. Co., 163 N.J. Super. 270, -,
394 A.2d 877,879 (App. Div. 1978); Finney v. Farmers Ins. Co., 92 Wash.2d 748, 752, 600 P.2d
1272, 1275 (1979).
12. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636 (Supp. 1980):
[Vol. 17:138
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vides, in relevant part, that no policy insuring a loss arising out of one's
use of an automobile can be issued, unless it provides coverage for the
protection of those who are legally entitled to recover damages from
uninsured motorists. 4 The statute further provides that "[c]overage
shall be not less than the amounts or limits prescribed for bodily injury
or death for a policy meeting the requirements of Section 7-204 of Title
47, Oklahoma Statutes."' 5 Since the "minimum coverage" provision is
at the very heart of the setoff issue, the validity of medical payment
setoffs depends on the interpretation given this statute.
There appear to be two judicial interpretations of the minimum
coverage provision. One is founded on the belief that the applicable
uninsured motorist statute was enacted solely to provide broad protec-
tion for innocent insured parties from the negligence of uninsured
tortfeasors.' 6 Courts adopting this view construe the minimum cover-
(A) No policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bod-
ily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or
use of a motor vehicle shall be issued, delivered, renewed, or extended in this state with
respect to a motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless the policy
includes the coverage described in subsection (B) of this section.
(B) The policy referred to in subsection (A) of this section shall provide coverage
therein or supplemental thereto for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehi-
cles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, includ-
ing death resulting therefrom. Coverage shall be not less than the amounts or limits
prescribed for bodily injury or death for a policy meeting the requirements of Section 7-
204 of Title 47, Oklahoma Statutes, as the same may be hereafter amended; provided,
however, that increased limits of liability shall be offered and purchased if desired, not to
exceed the limits provided in the policy of bodily injury liability of the insured ...
13. Compare OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636 (Supp. 1980) with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-284 (1973)
and GA. CODE ANN. § 56-407.1 (Supp. 1981). But cf. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (Supp. 1981)
(expressly allowing medical payment setoffs). Although no two states have identical uninsured
motorist statutes, most uninsured statutes are substantively the same.
14. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636(A), (B) (Supp. 1980).
15. Id. § (B); see OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 7-204 (Supp. 1980):
(a) No policy or bond shall be effective under Section 7-203... unless issued by an
insurance company or surety company authorized to do business in this state, except as
provided in subdivision (b) of this section, nor unless such policy or bond is subject, if
the accident has resulted in bodily injury or death, to a limit, exclusive of interest and
costs, of not less than Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000) because of bodily injury to or
death of one person in any one accident and, subject to said limit of one person, to a
limit of not less than Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000) because of bodily injury to or
death of two or more persons in any one accident, and if the accident has resulted in
injury to or destruction of property to a limit of not less than Ten Thousand Dollars
($10,000) because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one accident.
16. See, e.g., Protective Fire & Cas. Co. v. Woten, 186 Neb. 212, -, 181 N.W.2d 835, 837
(1970) (declaring that the Nebraska uninsured motorist statute "was enacted for the benefit of the
innocent victim[s] of financially irresponsible motorist[s]"); Fernandez v. Selected Risks Ins. Co.,
163 N.J. Super. 270, -, 394 A.2d 877, 879 (1978) (stating that a strong public policy exists "to
provide broad protection for the victims of automobile accidents caused by the negligence of
uninsured motorists").
4
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age provision liberally and denounce all attempts by insurers to restrict
uninsured motorist liability as being repugnant to legislative purpose.' 7
The other interpretation of the minimum coverage provision is
based on the conviction that the uninsured motorist statute was enacted
to allow the injured party to recover only those damages that he would
have recovered had the responsible party maintained liability insur-
ance. 8 These courts narrowly construe the minimum coverage provi-
sion and limit the insured claimant's uninsured motorist recovery to the
amount of the wrongdoer's would-be liability coverage. 19
The amount of the claimant's recovery will depend largely on the
court's interpretation of the applicable uninsured motorist statute. Ex-
amining litigation of the setoff issue in jurisdictions other than
Oklahoma will show how courts deem medical payment setoffs as ei-
ther consistent or inconsistent with legislative intent.
II. MEDICAL PAYMENT SETOFFS ARE VALID
A. Prevention of Double Recovery
Jurisdictions which support the validity of medical payment setoffs
against uninsured motorist recoveries interpret the applicable statute as
being intended to prevent double recovery by the insured.20 This argu-
17. See Protective Fire & Cas. Co. v. Woten, 186 Neb. 212, 181 N.W.2d. 835 (1970). The
court held an "other insurance" clause invalid, stating: "Policy provisions which conflict with
requirements of the uninsured motorist statute will not be effective to reduce an insured's recovery
below the amount necessary to fully indemnify him for his loss within the limits of all applicable
policies." Id. at 838. Another court expressed a similar sentiment in stating that: "[A]ny attempt
by an insurer to restrict the liability on [an uninsured motorist] endorsement. . . is repugnant to
both the intent and meaning of the statute. The policy must be given effect in accordance with the
Legislature." Fernandez v. Selected Risks Ins. Co., 163 N.J. Super. 270, -, 394 A.2d 877, 880
(App. Div. 1978) (citing Beek v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 135 N.J. Super. 1, 5, 342 A.2d 547, 549 (App.
Div. 1975)); accord, Simpson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 225 Kan. 508, 592 P.2d 445 (1979); Saffore v.
Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 21 N.J. 300, 121 A.2d 543 (1956); Pasterchick v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
150 N.J. Super. 90, 374 A.2d 1243 (App. Div. 1977).
18. Finney v. Farmers Ins. Co., 92 Wash. 2d 748, 751, 600 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1979); see, e.g.,
Weemhoff v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 41 Ohio St. 2d 231, -, 325 N.E.2d 239, 241 (1975) (interpreting
the Ohio statute as intended "to protect persons injured in automobile accidents from losses
which, because of the tortfeasor's lack of liability coverage, would otherwise go uncompensated");
Day v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 261 Pa. Super. 216, 396 A.2d 3 (1978); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Bafus, 77 Wash. 2d 720, 724, 466 P.2d 159, 161 (1970) (stating that the "insurance
carrier which issued the policy stands. . . in the shoes of the uninsured motorist to the extent of
the carrier's policy limits").
19. See Finney v. Farmers Ins. Co., 92 Wash. 2d 748, 600 P.2d 1272 (1979). The court denied
the insured claimant the right to stack his uninsured motorist coverages, reasoning that his recov-
ery must be limited to the wrongdoers liability coverage as if the wrongdoer had been insured.
Id. at 751, 600 P.2d at 1275; accord, Weemhoffv. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 41 Ohio St. 2d 231, -, 325
N.E.2d 239, 243 (1975).
20. See Canizzo v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 245 Cal. App. 2d 70, 53 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1966) (em-
5
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ment focuses on the belief that the insured's receipt of both medical
payment and uninsured motorist damages would overcompensate him
for his injuries.
This fear of the insured enjoying a double recovery is evidenced in
Cole v. Inland National Insurance Co.21 In that case, the court allowed
the insurance company's medical payment setoff22 because the insured
claimant could be fully compensated under his uninsured motorist cov-
erage. Espousing the double recovery rationale, the court stated:
It is our view that there is no policy consideration under-
lying uninsured motorist coverage which requires an applica-
tion of the insurance policy provisions which will result in
double payment of medical expenses. Permitting deduction
of the payment made under the medical expense coverage as
is provided by a provision of the policy, avoids double pay-
ment of this expense by the insurer without reducing the pro-
tection afforded the insured under the uninsured motorist
coverage.23
The double recovery theory focuses on the windfall enjoyed by the in-
sured,24 while simultaneously considering the undue hardship which
double payment imposes on the insurer.25
ploying CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(e) to allow setoff); Connelley v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas.
Co., 219 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 1969). But see Wilkinson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 298 So. 2d
915 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (enforcing medical payment setoff only if necessary to prevent duplication
of recovery); Miller v. Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co., 33 A.D.2d 916, 307 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1970);
Jenkins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., [1970] AuTo. INS. CAS. (CCH) 6711.
21. 133 Ill. App. 2d 745, 273 N.E.2d 65 (1971).
22. The setoff provision provided: "The company shall not be obligated to pay under this
Coverage that part of the damages which the insured may be entitled to recover from the owner or
operator of an uninsured automobile which represents expenses for medical services paid or paya-
ble under Part 2." Id. at -, 273 N.E.2d at 66.
23. Id. at -, 273 N.E.2d at 67; accord, Ramsden v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 123 Ga.
App. 163, 179 S.E.2d 671 (1971); Laurie v. Holland Am. Ins. Co., 31 Ill. App. 2d 437, 176 N.E.2d
678 (1961); Weemhoffv. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 41 Ohio St. 2d 231, 234, 325 N.E.2d 239, 243 (1975).
Contra, Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 207 N.W.2d 348 (1973). Addressing
the validity of medical payment setoffs in Van Tassel, the court considered the windfall argument
stating: "But if the question must be resolved on the basis of who gets a windfall, it seems more
just that the insured who has paid a premium should get all he paid for rather than that the
insurer should escape liability for that which it collected a premium." Id. at -, 207 N.W.2d at
352. See also Note, Uninsured Motorist Coverage-Setoff ofArounts Payable Under Medical Pay-
ments Coverage, 23 U. MIAMI L. REy. 249, 251 (1969).
24. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co..v. Harper, 125 Ga. App. 696,-, 188 S.E.2d 813, 817
(1972). The court stated that "[i]t seems clear the policy of the Uninsured Motorists Act is not to
allow an insured to 'stack coverage' in order to recover amounts in excess of his actual damages."
25. See Miller v. Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co., 33 A.D.2d 916, -, 307 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594
(1970) (enforcing the setoff provision in order to prevent a "duplicate medical payment of $15 1").
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B. Clear Meaning Rule
A second rationale used by courts to uphold the validity of medi-
cal payment setoffs against uninsured motorist coverage is the "clear
meaning" rule. This interpretation dictates that if the terms of a setoff
provision are clear and unambiguous, the provision is valid.26 The
clear meaning rule was used to uphold a medical payment setoff provi-
sion in Morgan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." In
that case, five automobile passengers suffered serious injuries in a colli-
sion with an uninsured motorist. Since the damages suffered by the
injured parties were extensive, there was no threat of the insured par-
ties receiving a double recovery.28 Nevertheless, the court enforced the
setoff provision based upon the clear language of the insurance policy.
The court reasoned that "Itihe insurer has a right to limit its liability in
any way it chooses; and these limitations will be enforced so long as
they are not ambiguous, or contrary to statute or public policy. '29
Implicit in the clear meaning rule is a judicial reluctance to inter-
fere in contracts agreed to by competent parties.30 Expressing this sen-
timent, one court stated: "If no ambiguity exists in the terms of the
insurance policy, a court cannot remake the contract, but must enforce
it as the parties made it."'3I The antithesis to the Morgan holding is
that ambiguous language will be interpreted in favor of the insured.32
A determination of whether language is ambiguous is left to the discre-
26. See, e.g., Boehler v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 290 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Ark. 1968); Robey
v. Northwestern Sec. Ins. Co., 270 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Ark. 1967); Robinson v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
267 So. 2d 257 (La. Ct. App. 1972); Bailes v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 123
(La. Ct. App. 1971), cerl. denied, 409 U.S. 872 (1972); Connelley v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas.
Co., 219 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 1969). See generally A. WIDiss, supra note 2, at 117.
27. 195 So. 2d 648 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
28. Id. at 650.
29. Id.; accord, Robinson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 267 So. 2d 257, 258 (La. Ct. App. 1972); Con-
nelley v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 219 So. 2d 206, 209 (La. Ct. App. 1969); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Hollender, 38 Cal. 2d 73, 75, 237 P.2d 510, 513 (1951); c. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v.
Smith, 57 Ala. App. 506, -, 329 So. 2d 562, 564 (Civ. App. 1976) (clear meaning rule used to
enforce other insurance clause).
30. See Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Collins, 280 Ala. 373, 194 So. 2d 532 (1967);
Ogburn v. Travelers Ins. Co., 207 Cal. 50, 276 P. 1004 (1929); Pettid v. Edwards, 195 Neb. 713, 240
N.W.2d 344 (1976).
31. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Smith, 57 Ala. App. 506, -, 329 So. 2d 562, 565 (Civ. App.
1976); see Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Collins, 280 Ala. 373, -, 194 So. 2d 532, 535
(1967).
32. Wittig v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 300 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ind. 1969); accord, Continen-
tal Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 296 P.2d 801 (1956); Stephens v. Allied Mut.
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tion of the trial court.3
III. MEDICAL PAYMENTS SETOFFS ARE INVALID
A. Minimum Statutory Rule
Those courts which determine that setoff provisions are invalid34
interpret such provisions as void against public policy because they at-
tempt to reduce uninsured motorist coverage below that required by
statute .3  Assume for instance, that State C enacted an uninsured mo-
torist statute which required that all insurance carriers provide their
insured with $20,000 uninsured motorist coverage. Duncan purchases
minimal uninsured motorist coverage and is injured in a collision with
Gaines, an uninsured motorist. Duncan's insurance policy contains a
medical payment setoff provision. As Duncan is to receive $5,000
under his medical payment coverage, this amount, if set off against his
33. Wittig v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 300 F. Supp. 679, 680-81 (N.D. Ind. 1969). In Wittig,
the policy provided that the "insured may not recover sums under the uninsured motorist cover-
age representing expenses paid or payable under medical coverage." The court found the clause
susceptible to two interpretations: (1) any sum recovered or recoverable under medical payment
coverage is to be deducted from the uninsured motorist coverage, and (2) only sums which exceed
the insured's damages may be deducted from his uninsured motorist coverage. The court con-
cluded that, as the clause was ambiguous, the interpretation more favorable to the insured claim-
ant would be applied. Id. at 681.
34. See Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 54 Ala. App. 343, 308 So.
2d 255 (1975); McCarthy v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 454 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1972) (Arizona
law); Bacchus v. Farmers Ins. Group Exch., 106 Ariz. 280, 475 P.2d 264 (1970); Heiss v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 250 Ark. 474,465 S.W.2d 699 (1971); Tuggle v. Government Employees Ins. Co.,
207 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1968); Phillips v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 437 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1971)
(Georgia law); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 126 Ga. App. 45, 190 S.E.2d 113
(1972); Glidden v. Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass'n, 57 Ill. 2d 330, 312 N.E.2d 247 (1974); Melson v.
Illinois Nat. Ins. Co., 1 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 274 N.E.2d 664 (1971); Wittig v. United Serv. Auto.
Ass'n, 300 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Berger, 311 F. Supp. 840 (E.D. Ky.
1970); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Siddons, 451 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970); Santillanes v. Banks, 86
Mich. App. 615, 273 N.W.2d 83 (1977); Keyes v. Beneficial Ins. Co., 39 Mich. App. 450, 197
N.W.2d 907 (1972); Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 207 N.W.2d 348 (1978);
Pleitgen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 296 Minn. 191, 207 N.W.2d 535 (1973); Talbot v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 291 So. 2d 699 (Miss. 1974); French v. Farmers Ins. Co., 354 F. Supp. 105 (E.D.
Mo. 1972); Webb v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 479 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); Ste-
phens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 562, 156 N.W.2d 133 (1968); Silas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 129
NJ. Super. 99, 322 A.2d 464 (App. Div. 1974); Shearer v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 53 Ohio St. 2d
1, 371 N.E.2d 210 (1978); Weemhoff.v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 37 Ohio Misc. 14, 306 N.E.2d 194
(1973); Kinkead v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 207, 276 N.E.2d 673 (1970); Bogart v.
Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 473 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1973) (Texas law); Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v.
Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1974); Lyon v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 311,
480 P.2d 739 (1971); Moomaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 379 F. Supp. 697 (S.D.W. Va.
1974); Tulley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.W. Va. 1972).
35. See, e.g., Damsel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 207 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1968); Tuggle v.
Government Employees Ins. Co., 207 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1968) (Damsel was a companion case to
Tuggle, as the two cases were considered factually identical).
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uninsured motorist coverage, would reduce Duncan's recovery to
$15,000, an amount below the statutory minimum. 6
A case illustrating the minimum statutory rule and holding medi-
cal payment setoffs invalid is Tuggle v. Government Employees Insur-
ance Co .7 The Florida Supreme Court confronted the carrier's clear
meaning assertion with the public policy argument inherent in the min-
imum statutory rule.
In view of the fact that the two classes of coverage in-
volved in the policy under consideration were contracted sep-
arately, with independent premiums, we are unable to
distinguish this situation from that . . . relating to multiple
carriers. Nor does there appear to be any basis for treating
the set-off provision as amounting only to a contractual re-
duction of medical benefits, contrary to the actual language of
the policy stating in the provision for uninsured motorist cov-
erage that the company shall not be obligated to pay any part
of such liability which represents expense "payable" by the
insurer under its medical benefits coverage. The clause on its
face is one to decrease uninsured motorist coverage beneath
the statutory minimum, and one which means that under cer-
tain conditions (medical benefits in excess of $10,000) there
will be no uninsured motorist coverage whatever.3 8
In holding for the insured, the court recognized that if the setoff clause
were held valid, uninsured motorist coverage at the statutory minimum
level would be useless where medical payment coverage is at or above
that amount.3 9
The argument is that setoff provisions can operate to frustrate the
purpose of the legislature by reducing uninsured motorist coverage be-
low that mandated by statute. This contention reasons that legislative
intent for enacting minimum uninsured motorist protections cannot be
thwarted by use of the clear meaning rule assertions of the insured that
the parties are free to contract away the statutory minimum.40
36. See Phillips v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 437 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1971) (source of
facts in hypothetical).
37. 207 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1968).
38. Id. at 675.
39. Id.; accord, Phillips v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 437 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1971); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Carrico, 200 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1967).
40. See Phillips v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 437 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1971); Stephens v.
Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 562, 156 N.W.2d 133 (1968). In Stephens, the court stated: "A
provision, drawn by-the insurer to comply with the statutory requirement of uninsured motorist
coverage, must be construed in light of the purpose and policy of the statute." d. at -, 156
N.W.2d at 136. The court later explained that "[t]he proper construction of this. . .[provision]
[Vol. 17:13 8
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B. Separate Contract Rationale
Medical payment setoffs are also invalidated on the basis of a
"separate contract" rationale. Courts employing this theory reason that
since each type of coverage purchased by the insured (liability, medical
payment, uninsured motorist) demands payment of a separate pre-
mium, each coverage constitutes a separate contract. As these separate
protections are unrelated to each other, Coverage A, for example, can-
not be deducted from Coverage B to reduce the amount of the insured's
recovery.41
This theory is sometimes used to refute the double recovery ration-
ale. In the 1965 Florida case of Sims v. National Casualty Co.,42 the
court held that the windfall or double indemnity argument for uphold-
ing setoffs was inapplicable when separate premiums were paid for
medical payment and uninsured motorist coverages.43 The Sims court
reasoned that the insured claimant's uninsured motorist and medical
payment coverages were separate contracts bound by independent con-
siderations, and that the insured's receipt of medical payments would
not affect the amount of his uninsured motorist recovery. 4
Courts use the separate contract rationale to invalidate medical
payment setoffs against uninsured motorist coverage in an attempt to
fulfill the expectations of the insured claimant.45 The insured party
should not be an exercise in the blind semantics of literal language construction." Id. at -, 156
N.W.2d at 138.
41. See, e.g., Employers Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Parker, 286 Ala. 42, 236 So. 2d 699 (1970); Alabama
Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 54 Ala. App. 343, 308 So. 2d 255 (Civ. App. 1975);
Bacchus v. Farmers Ins. Group Exch., 106 Ariz. 280, 475 P.2d 264 (1970); Tuggle v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 207 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1968); Sims v. National Cas. Co., 171 So. 2d 399 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Boettner v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 388 Mich. 482, 201 N.W.2d 795 (1972);
Fletcher v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 80 Mich. App. 439, 264 N.W.2d 19 (1978); Citizens Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Turner, 53 Mich. App. 616, 220 N.W.2d 203 (1974); Keyes v. Beneficial Ins. Co., 39 Mich.
App. 450, 197 N.W.2d 907 (1972); Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 207
N.W.2d 348 (1973); cf. Bose v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 186 Neb. 209, 181 N.W.2d 839
(1970) (case in which the "separate contract" rationale was used to allow the stacking of cover-
ages); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Maglish, 94 Nev. 699, 586 P.2d 313 (1978) (stacking allowed). See also
A. WIDISS, supra note 2, § 2.62; P. PRETZEL, supra note 1, § 22.6.
42. 171 So. 2d 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
43. Id. at 400.
44. The Sims opinion stated that the insurer was called upon "to comply with two separate
contract provisions by which... it... agreed to pay (1) the amount due [the] insured from an
uninsured driver [uninsured motorist coverage], and (2) [the] insured's medical expenses ....
[Tihe fact that the damages recoverable from the uninsured driver included medical expenses was
immaterial." Id.
45. See Keyes v. Beneficial Ins. Co., 39 Mich. App. 450, 197 N.W.2d 907 (1972); cf. Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Maglish, 94 Nev. 699, 586 P.2d 313 (1978) (allowing the insured to stack coverages to
the full extent for which he has paid the premiums).
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pays separate premiums with the expectation that he will receive sepa-
rate payments if a claim arises.' The courts thus simultaneously ad-
here to the fundamental concept of independent contracts and prevent
the insurer from frustrating the insured's expectations.47
C. Collateral Source Rule
A third method of defeating medical payment setoffs against unin-
sured motorist coverage is based upon the "collateral source" rule
which prevents a wrongdoer from mitigating his damages by showing
payment to the injured party from a source unrelated to himself.48
Some courts reason that the insurer is not "the wrongdoer" who is at-
tempting to mitigate his damages, and therefore the collateral source
rule does not apply to insurers.49 These courts are simply unwilling to
extend this punitive rule, originally aimed at the wrongdoer, to "an
insurer who is doing the paying out of a fund created by the injured
party."50
Refusing to apply the collateral source rule to insurers, however,
indicates judicial insensitivity to the primary purpose of uninsured mo-
torist coverage: "to pay the insured the damages he would normally be
entitled to receive for bodily injuries caused" by an uninsured motorist
46. Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181,-, 207 N.W.2d 348, 353-54 (1978).
The court stated:
We are convinced that plaintiffs should get what they paid for and that medical coverage
is a separate part of the contract from uninsured-motorist coverage. The medical insur-
ance was not bought and paid for by the insured for the benefit of the insurer. Conse-
quently, medical insurance may not be used to dilute the statutorily mandated
uninsured-motorist coverage.
Id. For the court's comment on the "windfall" argument, see note 23 supra.
47. See Employers Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Parker, 286 Ala. 42, -, 236 So. 2d 699, 705 (1970). The
court stated: "Having promised, in the event of an accident, to provide medical payments cover-
age for a consideration of $3.00 and having promised to provide uninsured motorists coverage for
an independent consideration of $2.00. . .[the insurer] cannot now be heard to complain if it is
held to both promises." Id.
48. See, eg., Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Kincaid, 199 So. 2d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Standard
Accident Ins. Co. v. Gavin, 184 So. 2d 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Hack v. Great Am. Ins. Co.,
175 So. 2d 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Stephens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 562, 156
N.W.2d 133 (1968); cf. Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 185 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1966)
(invalidating other insurance clause and allowing stacking). But c. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Bafus, 77 Wash. 2d 720,466 P.2d 159 (1970) (upholding other insurance clause). Seegener.
ally Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46 MINN. L. Rav. 669
(1962); see also M. WOODROOF, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY AND THE CHANGING LAW 16 (1972).
49. Burcharn v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 255 Iowa 69, 121 N.W.2d 500 (1963); see, e.g., State
Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bafus, 77 Wash. 2d 720, 466 P.2d 159 (1970).
50. Note, Uninsured Motorist Coverage-SetoffofAmounts Payable Under MedicalPayments
Coverage, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 249, 255 (1969).
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who is legally at fault.5' In other words, uninsured motorist coverage is
statutorily mandated to place the insurer in the shoes of the wrongdoer
for the purpose of compensating the injured party.52
With this purpose in mind, the following hypothetical illustrates
the collateral source dilemma. Jan was seriously injured in a car acci-
dent when Kate, an insured motorist, negligently ran a red light and
sideswiped Jan's car. Jan was hospitalized and immediately made a
claim under her own medical payment coverage for the full amount,
$5,000. Two months later, Jan was released from the hospital. She
assessed her expenses and damages at $20,000. Jan then sued Kate for
$20,000, who claimed the $20,000 on her liability coverage. Kate's in-
surer mailed Jan a check for the full amount, as the collateral source
rule precluded the insurance company from mitigating its liability
through a showing of Jan's previously received medical payments. Jan
was thus able to recover $25,000.
Assume now that Kate was uninsured. The medical payment
setoff provision in Jan's policy would, if valid, limit Jan's recovery to
$20,000. This result, however, would be inconsistent with the purpose
of the uninsured motorist coverage that the injured party be compen-
sated as if the wrongdoer possessed liability insurance. It is therefore
necessary, if the legislative purpose is to be satisfied, that Jan's insurer
be treated as the wrongdoer for the purposes of applying the collateral
source rule.53
A Florida court applied the collateral source rule to the setoff issue
in Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Kincaid.54 The court recognized that the
insured claimant could have received both medical payment and liabil-
ity compensation from the wrongdoer, had the wrongdoer been in-
sured. Applying the fiction that the insurer wears the shoes of the
uninsured wrongdoer, Kincaid held that the insured claimant was enti-
tled to both medical payment and uninsured motorist recovery. 55
51. P. PRETZEL, supra note 1, at 21; see Stephens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 562, -,
156 N.W.2d 133, 139 (1968). The court held a medical payment setoff to be invalid because "the
insured is entitled to recover the same amount he would have recovered if the offending motorist
had maintained liability insurance." Id.
52. P. PRETZEL, supra note 1, at 46.
53. See Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Kincaid, 199 So. 2d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (source of facts
in hypothetical).
54. Id. Mr. and Mrs. Kincaid were injured in an automobile accident with an uninsured
motorist. They were to have been paid $10,000 from their medical payments coverage, but § 6(d)
of their policy sought to deduct medical payments from their uninsured medical coverage. The
Kincaids then challenged the validity of § 6(d). Id. at 771.
55. Id. at 772.
1981]
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 17 [1981], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol17/iss1/7
TULSA LAW JOURTAL
IV. Is THERE A MAJORITY RULE?
Automobile insurance is a matter of state concern which is regu-
lated by statute.56 Due to the local character of uninsured motorist
coverage, no uniform rule can be identified nationwide. While some
authorities are hesitant to recognize a majority rule on the setoff issue, 7
there is evidence of a trend toward holding such setoffs unenforce-
able.58 An examination of the jurisdictions that have litigated the setoff
issue reveals that eighteen states have held medical payment setoffs in-
valid while only four states have enforced such setoffs.59 One court
summarized the overall trend: "The generalrule is that an insurer may
not limit its liability under uninsured motorist coverage by setoffs...
or medical payment reduction clauses."6
V. WILL OKLAHOMA FOLLOW THE TREND AND HOLD MEDICAL
PAYMENT SETOFFS INVALID?
The validity of medical payment setoffs has not yet been litigated
in Oklahoma. Litigation of analogous issues, however, reveals a judi-
cial attitude that favors the insured. Examination of these related is-
sues will hopefully indicate the probable fate of the setoff question in
Oklahoma.
A. Oklahoma's Treatment of Analogous Issues
In 1976, the Oklahoma Supreme Court confronted the stacking is-
sue in Keel v. MFA Insurance Co.,6 and held that other insurance
56. C. SUNDERLIN, SUNDERLIN ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 4 (1929) states: "The insurance
business is charged with a public interest and as such is subject to the police power of the state and
subject to state control and supervision."
57. See, e.g., Note, Uninsured Motorit Coverage-Setoff of Amounts Payable under Medical
Payments Coverage, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 249, 254 (1969) ("Since the cases involve interpretation
of statutes which vary from state to state, it would be meaningless to attempt to formulate a
'majority' position on the acceptance or rejection of such provisions.")
58. P. PRETZEL, supra note 1, at 51 ("There is at least some evidence of a trend toward
allowing full collection up to the full amount of the uninsured motorist coverage in addition to
such medical payments as are due under the medical payment coverage."); A. WIDSS, supra note
2, at 216 ("[It is fair to conclude that there is a clear trend developing under which the clauses are
held to be unenforceable.").
59. California, Louisiana, New York, and Tennessee have held setoffs valid. See notes 20-33
supra and accompanying text. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Texas, Utah,
and West Virginia have held setoffs invalid. See notes 34-55 supra and accompanying text.
60. Stephens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 562,-, 156 N.W.2d 133, 139 (1968) (emphasis
added).
61. 553 P.2d 153 (Okla. 1976). In this case, Robert Keel was injured when the car he was
driving was struck by a car driven by an uninsured motorist. Keel had purchased two insurance
[Vol. 17:138
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clauses were ineffective to preclude the insured from stacking his unin-
sured motorist coverages.62 The court, employing the separate contract
argument,63 reasoned that the other insurance clause was contrary to
public policy because Keel had paid separate premiums for the cover-
ages and was thus entitled to the benefits of each. a The court also
addressed the windfall argument and used it against the insurer, stating
that the other insurance clause, if upheld, would allow the insurer to
reap the benefits incidental to its collection of the separate premiums
while permitting the company to avoid its obligation to pay the insured
claimant his legal entitlement.65 Under this analysis, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court determined the stacking issue in favor of the insured.
In 1977, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Biggs v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 66 which considered the valid-
ity of a provision requiring "physical contact" between the insured and
the wrongdoer as a prerequisite to recovery under the insured's unin-
sured motorist coverage.67 The insured party in Biggs was denied her
claim because she was injured when she swerved off the road in an
attempt to avoid a collision with a negligent driver.68 The court placed
the insured in the shoes of the wrongdoer and held the physical contact
clause unenforceable, stating:
policies from MFA and sought to collect the $10,000 maximum recovery on each policy. Id. at
154.
62. Id.
63. The rationale is that because separate premiums were paid for the insured's uninsured
motorist coverage and his medical payment coverage, the insurer was precluded from deducting
medical payments from the insured's uninsured motorist recovery. See Sims v. National Cas. Co.,
171 So. 2d 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
64. In Keel, the court explained that other insurance clauses are "contrary to public policy,
repugnant to our uninsured motorist statute and void for. . .the appellee has paid and the appel-
lant collected, separate premiums for each uninsured motorist coverage." 553 P.2d 153, 155
(Okla. 1976).
65. By imposition of both policies, the insured is not receiving a windfall. He has paid
the insurer a premium for this protection, and is only attempting to recover the actual
amount of his damages which are within the limits of both policies. On the other hand,
the insurer has collected a premium for each policy. In such instance, it would be mani-
festly unjust to permit the insurer to avoid its statutorily imposed liability by its assertion
of "other insurance clauses" which would deny the insured from receiving that for which
he has paid a premium.
Id. at 156.
66. 569 P.2d 430 (Okla. 1977).
67. The insurance policy examined by the Biggs court provided in a relevant part that the
insurer must: "[play all sums which the insured. . . shall be legally entitled to recover as dam-
ages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle. ... Id. at 43 1.
The policy defined such a vehicle as follows: "A land motor vehicle which causes bodily
injury to an insured arising out ofphysical contact of such vehicle with the insured.. . at the time
of the accident . Id. (emphasis in original).
68. Id.
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Since the purpose of our uninsured motorist statute is to af-
ford the same protection to a person injured by an uninsured
motorist as he would have had if the negligent motorist had
carried liability insurance, it would defeat the purpose of the
statute to allow insurance contracts to require impact before
coverage would be extended to their insured.69
The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently exhibited an attitude
favorable to the insured through its decision in MFA Insurance Co. V.
Hankins.7 ° In Hankins, the party at fault was not totally without insur-
ance, but was simply "underinsured."' The court, however, stated that
the Oklahoma uninsured motorist statute applied to underinsured as
well as uninsured motorists, thereby expanding the scope of the in-
sured's coverage while increasing the liability of the insurer.72
The Keel, Biggs, and Hankins decisions reveal judicial sympathy
in the Oklahoma Supreme Court toward the insured. The Keel deci-
sion is particularly persuasive evidence that medical payment setoffs
will be held invalid when challenged in an Oklahoma court, as the sim-
ilarities between the stacking issue and the setoff issue often inspire the
same policy arguments.73
The Oklahoma Legislature, also, acts as a protector of the in-
sured.74 Oklahoma's uninsured motorist statute was amended in 1976,
adding a provision that any payment made by an underinsured
tortfeasor could not be used by an insurer to limit its uninsured motor-
ist liability toward the insured claimant.75 This statute precludes an
insurer from setting off payments made by an inadequately insured
motorist against an insured's uninsured motorist coverage.76 The type
69. Id. at 433.
70. 610 P.2d 785 (Okla. 1980).
71. "Underinsured" means that the amount of the insured's coverage is below that required
by statute.
72. Id. at 788; see OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636(C) (Supp. 1980) (Uninsured Motorist Cover-
age). The Hankins court, however, refused to apply § 3636(C) retroactively since the clause, as
amended, was not a remedial measure, but rather a matter of substance. MFA Ins. Co. v. Han-
kins, 610 P.2d 785, 788 (Okla. 1980).
73. Compare Boetter v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 388 Mich. 482, 201 N.W.2d 795 (1972)
and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Maglish, 94 Nev. 699, 586 P.2d 313 (1978) with Sims v. National Cas. Co.,
171 So. 2d 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) and Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181,
207 N.W.2d 348 (1978). See generally, Comment, Intra-Policy Stacking of Uninsured Motorist and
Medical Payments Coverages To Be Or Not To Be, 22 S.D.L. REv. 349 (1977).
74. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636 (Supp. 1980) (Uninsured Motorist Coverage).
75. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636(E) (Supp. 1980) provides "that any payment made by the
insured tort-feasorshallnot reduce or be a credit against the total liability limits as provided in the
insured's own uninsured motorist coverage" (emphasis added).
76. Id. Consider the following illustration:
Driver A is seriously injured when involved in an accident with negligent Driver B. Driver B
[Vol. 17:138
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of setoff banned by the statute is similar to the medical payment setoff
since both setoffs reveal efforts by insurers to limit the recoveries of the
insured. Since the Oklahoma Legislature has sought to statutorily
quash one such setoff measure used by the insurers, it is but one step
away from defeating the medical payment setoff.
Even though Oklahoma statutory and case law only address issues
analogous to the setoff question, they do reveal a legal climate
favorable to the insured. These decisions and the amended statute
strongly indicate that medical payment setoffs will be held invalid
when the issue arises in an Oklahoma court.
VI. CONCLUSION
When automobile insurance was created in the 1920's, it was origi-
nally intended to cushion the harsh effects of accidents on the in-
sured.77 Insurers necessarily assumed a protective role in society and
have been said to maintain a fiduciary relationship with their policy-
holders.78 This "special relationship" between the parties to insurance
contracts differs from typical contractual relationships because the in-
surer's obligation to the public is theoretically of greater importance
than its desire to reap some financial advantage.79
It is in light of this special duty owed by the insurer to the insured
that the propriety of medical payment setoff provisions becomes sus-
pect. Those who support the validity of such provisions attempt to jus-
tify them by employing a plain meaning rationale.80 This theory
assumes that the parties to the contract are similarly situated, possess
equal bargaining power, and deal at arms length. On the contrary, an
insurance policy is not "an ordinary contract [but] is a complex instru-
ment, unilaterally prepared and seldom understood by the insured.
has liability coverage of $2,000, but as this amount is below the statutory minimum, he is consid-
ered underinsured. Nevertheless, Driver B's insurer pays Driver A the inadequate sum of $2,000.
Driver A files a claim for $10,000 under his uninsured motorist coverage with his insurer, XYZ
Insurance Company. XYZ attempts to deduct the $2,000 payment from Driver A's uninsured
motorist coverage, but discovers that § 3636 precludes him from doing so. Driver A therefore
enjoys a recovery of $10,000 under his uninsured motorist coverage, in addition to the $2,000 he
previously received from Driver B's insurer.
77. S. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 23 (1960).
78. See J. MCCARTHY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH CASES § 2.3, at 17 (1976) ("ITihe
relationship that exists between insured and insurer is special, and ... the insurer is on the level
of a public utility or an enterprise affected with the public interest.").
79. Id. This special obligation to the insured arises partially because "the insured does not
contract to obtain a commercial advantage but to protect himself against the risks of accidental
losses." Id.
80. For a definition of the plain meaning rule, see note 26 supra and accompanying text.
19811
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The parties are not similarly situated. The companies. . . are expert in
the field [whereas] the insured is not.""'
Because parties to insurance contracts seldom, if ever, have equal
bargaining power,82 the plain meaning argument is misplaced when
used as support for medical payment setoff provisions. This theory al-
lows the insurer to rely on the fiction of equal bargaining power to
justify its use of medical payment setoff provisions and, in so doing,
abandon its role as protector.8 3
Examination of the medical payment setoff issue has revealed a
clear national trend toward holding such provisions unenforceable.
The manner in which analogous issues have been resolved in
Oklahoma indicates that Oklahoma will follow the trend and hold such
setoffs invalid. Finally, in light of the public policy which conceives of
insurance as a protective device, it is logical that the medical payment
setoff provision should be defeated when the issue arises in an
Oklahoma court.
V. POSTSCRIPT
On December 15, 1981, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. State Boardfor Properqy & Casualty
Rates.84 This case held that title 36, section 6092 of the Oklahoma
Statutes85 prohibits the use of medical payment setoffs in any automo-
bile liability policy, including the uninsured motorist coverage. Ex-
panding earlier interpretations of the statute which limited its
prohibition to subrogation clauses, the court followed the view ex-
pressed in this article8 6 that medical payment setoff provisions should
be invalidated in Oklahoma.87
Don S. Smith
81. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Pietrosh, 85 Nev. 310, -, 454 P.2d 106, 110 (1969).
82. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 78, at 16.
83. Cf. Schmidt v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 735, 74 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1969)
(contracts of insurance are contracts of adhesion, since there is no bargaining between equal
parties).
84. 52 OKLA. B.J. 2972 (1981).
85. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 6092 (1971).
86. See notes 73-83 supra and accompanying text.
87. The opinion upheld this view as expressed in 10 Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 440 (1978) (setoff
provision invalid as to medical payments on behalf of the insured or household member) and 10
Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 559 (1978) (excess coverage exclusion is invalid in allowing setoff or subro-
gation to reduce automobile liability coverage by the amount of medical payments made to the
insured to household member).
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